Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Central Asia started to form a common agenda and shared positions on logistics, transportation, energy, security and foreign policy. The C5 format, which traditionally unites five Central Asian countries, is gradually transforming from being a consultation platform to discuss minor issues to an instrument for regional positioning with perspectives of becoming a union in the future. In this framework, the role of Azerbaijan, which is geographically located in the South Caucasus while in fact being pivotal in the Caspian-South Caucasus-Europe route, is becoming increasingly perceptible. For Kazakhstan, a key player in the Central Asian region, Azerbaijan’s participation in C6 format is not coincidental: Astana consistently promotes the idea of ​​Caspian cooperation and development of transcontinental transport corridors as well as multilateral diplomacy, in which the region is not the target of great power rivalry but rather shapes its own agenda. 

In order to understand the context within this process and Kazakhstan’s view in this matter, it is important to highlight that Azerbaijan recently has become a crucial strategic partner for Astana: in the last five years, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev have held at least five mutual governmental visits only in the context of bilateral relations. The intensity of the development of the relations between two countries are noticeable: joint military trainings together with other Turkic states, progress in terms of trade and increased importance of the Middle Corridor in the context of geopolitical tensions in the world are connecting interests of both countries, enlarging their perspectives for the cooperation in the future. Alongside with the enhanced cruciality of the Organization of Turkic States, which has a earned new status with its initial positioning as Turkic Council until the 8th Summit of OTS in Istanbul at 2021, as well as congratulation and recognition by Tokayev on restoration of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, these factors have definitely taken Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s bilateral relations to a relatively high level, and now the two countries are committed to start a new era of cooperation and mutual development thanks to Azerbaijan’s re-orientation as a subject to Central Asia’s regionalistic agenda. As a result of strong relations with Kazakhstan as well as with other Central Asian countries, together with the cruciality of better multisector interconnectivity,  in the 7th Consultative Meeting in Tashkent in November 2025 Azerbaijan joined the Consultative Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia as a full participant, which means that Azerbaijan has become the first country geographically located out of the Central Asian region to be included in this high-level regional forum. 

Does it mean that Azerbaijan would be considered as part of Central Asia? The short answer would be “no” from both from Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani sides, as joining this platform does not necessarily imply that Azerbaijan’s status from the perspective of geographical regionalism will completely change with its alignment to the C6. Kazakhstan traditionally conducts a variety of agreements and joint platforms from a pragmatic approach, and, in the current global situation, Azerbaijan is being perceived as a highly strategic partner. At the same time, Central Asian countries were trying to build their own regional union for decades right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the majority of discussions regarding this matter were initiated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan, but the format he was proposing never materialized. This process eventually happened naturally via the perception of the region as a united platform since the meeting of all Central Asian countries with Japan in 2004. Right now, the structure of the C6 with a new member will appear to be a multilayered structure, where Azerbaijan is considered as a natural ally, a brother country in terms of Turkic and post-Soviet background, a member of the OTS, and now also as a participant in Central Asian affairs within the C6. In Astana, there is quite awareness that Azerbaijan will not actively participate in all of the discussion within C6, and geographical difference still matters. However, there is a clear understanding that in other subjects Azerbaijan’s position is important, and mutual interests dominate over the differences. 

Kazakhstan positively perceives the alignment of Azerbaijan to the C5 platform, mainly due to the expanded opportunities in terms of infrastructure and logistics.

Astana needs more alternatives in terms of logistics to European countries, as well as the global market in general, and, taking into consideration that trade routes through Iran and Russia at the moment are not accessible due to sanctions and tensions in both of the regions, Azerbaijan is providing an alternative for the transportation of goods. It is necessary for Kazakhstan to have alternatives in strategic partnership due to the multivectoral policy of the country, where the leadership is trying to avoid dependency from any other power by differentiating its partners. One of the obstacles in this case would be bandwidth of the Caspian route through Azerbaijan: the port of Alat, despite being a major logistics hub in Eurasia, still needs to strengthen its capacity in order to support increased trans-Caspian trade since alternative ports are not maintaining large amounts of goods in their current capacities either. This issue might be overcome through the expansion of hubs in Aktau, Kazakhstan, and shorten the expenditures for transportation to 50%, also with the development of oil exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

Not less important is the factor of security, which Azerbaijan provides to Central Asia, and to Kazakhstan particularly. Astana and Baku already cooperate in the context of regional security and integration of the Turkic states, as both countries actively participate in developing key areas of cooperation such as joint military exercises and exchange of experience in military training. For example, in 2024, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan took part in the “Birlestik-2024” exercises, which were the first military training in Central Asia without the participation of extra-regional countries that were previously involved in such activities.  In the context of cross-border threats, militarization of adjacent territories, and raising competition between external powers, Baku, which has sufficient military experience and an already modernized army, is increasingly viewed in Astana as a potential partner for strengthening defense dialogue and developing military capacity within the framework of a broader Turkic architecture for the region. 

It is important to mention the Turkic factor within the new agreement and Azerbaijan as a new member in the Central Asian platform. Both government and public in Kazakhstan jointly give positive signals regarding Azerbaijan within the C6, mainly because there is no vacuum in the formation of their perception of Baku: both actors are fueled by the idea of ​​Turkic solidarity institutionalized within the OTS, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and other initiatives in similar contexts, which clearly signals that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have common initiatives to develop the "Turkic world”, which makes Kazakhstan perceive Azerbaijan as part of a wider Turkic ecosystem. It is an ideologically neutral, but symbolically significant factor that makes discussions of the "C5+Azerbaijan" format less doubtable in Astana, giving hope to include Azerbaijan into a long-term strategy of diversifying external relations, strengthening the Middle Corridor, and forming an autonomous Eurasian entity. However, it would be a mistake to overexaggerate Turkic elements, giving it main credits - both countries are known for developing a multicultural society, and in this regard this cooperation is viewed more from an opportunistic perspective, rather than an ideological one. 

However, as Kazakh political analyst and Head of Research at Nightingale, Eldaniz Gusseinov notes, there is still an asymmetry in mutual perception. As he argues, “Azerbaijan has known Central Asia for 30–35 years, but Central Asia does not really know Azerbaijan”. In many Central Asian discussions, Baku may still be perceived, according to Gusseinov, as a player which is largely connected to the “Karabakh syndrome”, where Azerbaijan’s image is narrowed primarily to the conflict agenda, especially in the expert fields, where dialogue is sometimes being shaped with complicities: “The dialogue is being constructed quite difficultly; there is an impact of recent success of Azerbaijan in Second Karabakh war in the Azerbaijani expert field since they were focusing on this issue and were less tend to learn from Central Asian colleagues regarding several problems on other fields”. He also emphasizes that Azerbaijan occasionally promotes narratives that are contradictory to the priorities of Central Asia, "for instance regarding the issue of Northern Cyprus or public speeches from the Azerbaijani officials that there would be discussions on the highest level about expanding military cooperation with a potential of making a union with Central Asia, which are not particularly interesting for the region”.

Moreover, as he underlines, “Azerbaijan associates itself more with the South Caucasus, while for Central Asia clarity of positioning is very important”, which raises certain regional scepticism from Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, towards Baku.

The obvious issue highlighted by the expert is the “lack of precise obligations and bureaucratic procedures within the organization”, which must be conducted in matters like expansion of the C5 platform to the C6, reasonably shadowing the clarity of procedures within the organization.

On the other hand, Tajik independent expert Umed Khakimov offers a more pragmatic and accurately optimistic evaluation from Dushanbe’s perspective. Initially, the expert highlights that “the C5+1 format has strengthened Tajikistan’s foreign policy positioning by enhancing political dialogue with global powers, providing access to climate, energy, and security programs, and creating additional opportunities for investment and infrastructure development, while also reinforcing Central Asia’s regional identity as an increasingly coherent international actor”.  In the context of Azerbaijan’s participation in this framework, he argues that "in Tajikistan Azerbaijan is still perceived more as an external actor, but at the same time as a state with steadily growing potential for meaningful partnership”. Following these dynamics, Mr Khakimov states that the “inclusion of Baku in the C6+1 framework is viewed by parts of the Tajik expert community as a logical and functionally justified expansion rather than a geopolitical shift”.

He emphasizes: “Azerbaijan’s value lies in strengthening Central Asia’s connectivity, especially through access to the Caspian route, energy corridors and as a transit subject towards Türkiye and Europe”.

Meanwhile, he notes a “degree of caution” in Tajik policy circles still exists; in Dushanbe it is believed that with Azerbaijan’s decision to join the platform Central Asia’s identity should remain and stay as a distinct geopolitical entity. Even though Tajikistan is interested in the expansion of the format out of the Central Asian geography, the participation of new actors must stay strictly pragmatic, delivering precise, material outcomes in transport infrastructure, energy cooperation, and investment flows. Mr Khakimov also provides specific examples of potential “drivers of trade”, which include “Tajik exports of aluminum and other metals, agricultural products such as dried and fresh fruits, cotton, as well as exports of pharmaceuticals and textiles, while Azerbaijan can offer expertise in energy technologies and petrochemicals”.

Following the opinion of the experts and analyzing all the factors, it is possible to highlight that the evolution from C5 to C6 does not represent a redefinition of Central Asian geographical boundaries; however, it expands regional cooperation and switches the agenda towards a more pragmatic approach, which is needed particularly for Kazakhstan in the current geopolitical turbulence. Even though Astana does not perceive Baku as a new “Central Asian” member, it indeed views Azerbaijan as a strategic partner, which is capable of being crucial in terms of connectivity, logistics, energy diversification, and at the same time an important ally in dealing with Caspian issues.

Active and fruitful bilateral relations built between Tokayev and Aliyev over recent years prove that this alignment is not merely a series of symbolic acts deriving from cultural and historical bonds, but rather a cooperation based on mutual interests in a wide variety of areas. It also builds foundations for future relations, which are being shaped by strategic calculations and right assumptions from both sides. The rising role of the Organization of Turkic States and significance of the Middle Corridor in the current agenda  are providing both institutional and infrastructural fundamentals for this enlargement. At the same time, the Turkic factor is not primary yet compared to material factors like economic and logistical incentives, which are mainly driving the process. Moreover, expert opinions and their analysis in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are showing that the transition towards C6 is coming alongside caution. Issues regarding institutional clarity, lack of mutual perception in certain areas and vulnerabilities regarding the protection of Central Asia’s distinct geopolitical identity are giving an image that the format will most likely be flexible rather than transform into a fully formalized alliance. Eventually, these facts once more lead to a conclusion that the C6 format will become more of an instrument of cooperation in a variety of common issues within regional perspectives, such as ecological problems in Caspian Sea, logistical concerns, economic prosperity and benefits of each actor. Kazakhstan’s perspective on this occasion might be characterized as strategically optimistic yet cautious in terms of institutionality.

Azerbaijan’s joining to this format is perceived more like an opportunity to develop regional autonomy, diversify international relations and cooperation, as well as give more power to the trans-Caspian regionalism without defragmenting Central Asia’s internal integrity.

In case operations would be managed pragmatically, the C6 may turn into a multi-layered platform, which consolidates Central Asia’s position as an object in Eurasia more than it will complicated and discourage it, leading to the reinforcement of the region’s aspiration and readiness to a coordinated response to the evolving international order.