The South Caucasus is entering a phase of geopolitical recalibration that is both overdue and transformative. For more than three decades, the region was locked in a structural paralysis shaped primarily by the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The Karabakh conflict created a logic of fragmentation that dictated political behavior: Armenia’s reliance on Russia hardened, Azerbaijan’s access to Türkiye depended entirely on Georgia, and Georgia emerged as the default transit state not because of its own inherent centrality but because alternative routes were politically impossible. With the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and the emergence of a realistic pathway toward a comprehensive Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, this logic is dissolving. Armenia has begun rethinking its dependence on Moscow, both out of necessity and disillusionment. Azerbaijan is expanding its connectivity footprint across the Caspian and deepening ties with Türkiye. Türkiye itself has become the principal regional actor able to engage all sides and push them forward. In turn, Russia is weakened and overstretched with less and less capacity to impose its will in the region it once dominated. As a result, we see an opportunity for the South Caucasus to become more integrated after decades.

One might expect Georgia, which was historically perceived as the most proactive, Western-aligned, and reform-oriented state in the South Caucasus, to play a crucial role in these processes. Yet what stands out today is that while Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiate directly, and Türkiye contributes to stabilizing initiatives, and the region is becoming more interconnected, Georgia’s detachment means it may not fully benefit from that emerging unity. Georgia, the state most structurally reliant on Western support given its unresolved territorial disputes, now appears less aligned with Western interests than either Armenia or Azerbaijan, which previously maintained far more complex, often ambivalent relationships with the West.

This internal shift in Georgia coincides with external developments that reduce its structural indispensability. For decades, Georgia’s status as the main East–West corridor rested on the fact that Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan were closed, which gave Tbilisi the status of  the only bridge between the Caspian basin and Europe. After transport corridors will be fully reopened between Armenia and Azerbaijan and normalization between Armenia and Türkiye is achieved, the region will acquire multiple connectivity options rather than one. The proposed U.S.-supported TRIPP, which envisions direct Armenian-Azerbaijani transit links bypassing Georgia, exemplifies that change. The very existence of that corridor and alternative routes will put competitive pressures that Georgia has not faced in three decades. The question now is whether Tbilisi adapts to this new reality or clings to a strategic posture designed for a past era.

The risk for Georgia is not merely economic diversification away from its territory, although that would directly impact transit revenues and undermine infrastructure investments. The greater danger lies in the erosion of political leverage. Connectivity creates interdependence, and interdependence generates influence. If Azerbaijan gains alternative westward corridors, its dependence on Georgia decreases; if Armenia gains alternative access to Türkiye, its potential engagement with Georgia becomes less structurally indispensable; if Türkiye expands multi-vector access to the Caspian region, its reliance on the Georgian route is no longer guaranteed. Thus, Georgia’s relevance declines not because its geography has shifted but because regional constraints have eased. It also diminishes Tbilisi’s bargaining position.

Compounding this is the widening distance between Georgia and its Western partners. For Tbilisi, Western engagement has historically served two roles: as a security anchor against Russia and as a political and economic incentive. As Georgia’s internal politics have become increasingly polarized and governance standards questioned, Western actors have scaled back certain programs or lowered their expectations. This has not gone unnoticed by Russia. Moscow has demonstrated repeatedly that it exploits political vacuums and diplomatic fatigue. Now, Georgia becomes a far easier target for Russian pressure, whether through economic influence, disinformation, or political manipulation.

Yet Georgia is not without options. Its strategic drift is concerning, but it is neither irreversible nor structurally predetermined. Georgia retains significant assets such as established transit infrastructure, strong relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, a population that remains overwhelmingly pro-European, and economic sectors integrated into Western markets. However, these assets require political vision, which currently appears diluted. If Georgia does not proactively engage in shaping the regional agenda emerging from the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process, it risks becoming a bystander to its neighbours’ negotiations. If Tbilisi does not build back its once-robust ties with the EU and the United States, it risks losing the geopolitical support required to manage its security risks. If it does not modernize and expand its logistics infrastructure, it risks falling behind new transit alternatives.

On the other hand, even if alternative corridors materialise, Georgia will remain the principal facilitator of regional transit in the short and medium term. In practice, it has been already playing this role for a long time. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars line has an annual freight capacity of about 5 million tons, with plans to raise this to roughly 17 million tons by 2034. In parallel, modernization of Georgia’s main rail artery has increased its overall rail capacity from about 27 million tons per year to nearly 48 million tons. By contrast, any Armenian segment of the proposed TRIPP corridor will require extensive construction with full operationalization before 2028 highly unlikely. In other words, even if an Armenian-based corridor opens around the end of this decade, it will initially complement, not replace, Georgian transit. However, Georgia’s current infrastructural advantage does not eliminate the long-term strategic risks; rather, it buys Tbilisi time to recalibrate its political and diplomatic direction before new corridors mature.

A further dimension that deserves attention is the South Caucasus-Central Asia nexus. The idea of a “5+3” format has the potential to evolve from a conceptual framework into a functional platform. There are several potential sectors where cooperation could yield structural benefits for all countries: environmental and water security, connectivity, energy, and trade. This form of cooperation could transform two traditionally fragmented regions into interconnected economic and geopolitical actors capable of exerting greater influence on their own terms. Furthermore, the surge of European attention toward strengthening Europe-Central Asia connectivity, together with the likelihood of multiplying transit volumes, means that both Georgia and Armenia will find opportunities to assert themselves within these expanding transit and logistics networks.